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This study investigates the relationship between intelligence and individual differences
in children’s moral development across a range of different moral transgressions. Taking
up prior research that showed morality and intelligence to be related in adolescents
and adults, the current study wants to test if these findings can be extended to
younger children. The study was designed to address some of the shortcomings in prior
research by examining young children aged between 6 years; 4 months and 8 years;
10 months, using a broad concept of moral development including emotional aspects
and applying an approach that is closely connected to children’s daily lives. Participants
(N = 129) completed a standardized intelligence test and were presented four moral
transgression stories to assess moral development. Results demonstrated that findings
from prior research with adolescents or adults cannot simply be extended to younger
participants. No significant correlations of moral development and intelligence were
found for any of the presented stories. This provides first evidence that – at least
in middle childhood – moral developmental status seems to be independent from
children’s general intelligence assessed by figural inductive reasoning tests.
Keywords: intelligence, cognitive development, moral development, moral reasoning, moral emotions
INTRODUCTION
This study examines the relationship between intelligence and individual differences in children’s
moral development. As common in the field of moral development research, we use the term
‘moral development’ not only to describe the course of moral development but also for the
characterization of an empirically ascertainable moral developmental status. Researchers from
different fields have documented numerous facets of the development of children’s morality,
by describing moral judgments (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969), moral reasoning (e.g., Eisenberg et al.,
1983), moral emotions (Eisenberg, 2000), or moral motivation (e.g., Nunner-Winkler, 2007).
Although in general, there are clear patterns of moral development, children vary in the speed
and levels of achieved moral development (Nunner-Winkler, 1998). It remains to be clarified
which factors explain these individual differences in children’s moral development. Following
Kohlberg’s (1969) idea of a stage model which assumes that moral stages are structured in the
same developmental sequence as intelligence operations, it is self-evident to consider intelligence
as a factor to adequately explain differences in moral development.
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Kohlberg (1969, 1975) as well as researchers from the neo-
kohlbergian approach (e.g., Rest et al., 1999) have theoretically
elaborated and empirically examined the idea that cognitive
and moral development are interrelated and go hand in hand.
Moral development requires a variety of abilities which are
related to cognitive processes and their efficiency: complex
situations need to be interpreted, relevant information must
be selected and processed, information needs to be integrated,
perspectives need to be coordinated, consequences of actions
need to be anticipated, inferences need to be made, social
norms (e.g., equity, fairness, etc.) need to be restructured and
applied (Rest, 1986; Dentici and Pagnin, 1992; Derryberry et al.,
2005). Therefore, it seems plausible that moral judgments or
decisions require reasoning abilities and problem solving skills
(Derryberry et al., 2005). In other words, a well-developed
morality requires a complex organism with the potential for
abstract reasoning. And according to Silverman (1994, p. 112)
‘high intelligence is synonymous with abstract reasoning ability
and complexity of thought,’ thus intelligence can be assumed
to affect moral development. Further, most of these necessary
cognitive processes are connected to information processing.
Thus, information processing capacities are crucial and since
higher intelligence is associated with more efficient information
processing (Kail and Salthouse, 1994), more intelligent people
should be better able to integrate and coordinate information
efficiently and make more sophisticated moral judgments and
justifications.
Empirical evidence for this was provided by research on the
gifted in which giftedness was found to be related to advanced
moral reasoning skills. For example, Derryberry et al. (2005)
found that gifted adolescents were advanced in their moral
judgments in comparison to a group of non-gifted children and
in both groups, intelligence was a significant predictor for the
moral scores. Likewise, Howard-Hamilton and Franks (1995)
could show that the gifted high school students in their study
were advanced in their moral development showing mean moral
scores which are near the level of college students. Lee and
Olszewski-Kubilius (2006) also showed that gifted students are
more morally sensitive and advanced in moral reasoning than
students from unselected samples. A range of older studies
similarly indicated a higher level of moral development for
gifted students (e.g., Thorndike, 1940; Karnes and Brown, 1981;
Tan-Willman and Gutteridge, 1981; Janos and Robinson, 1985;
Howard-Hamilton, 1994; Silverman, 1994).
However, four major issues need to be addressed concerning
prior research in this field. Firstly, most of the studies examined
adolescents or even young adults. Only few studies have dealt
with younger children. Yet, there is some evidence that also
in younger age groups gifted children are advanced in moral
reasoning compared to their non-gifted peers. For instance,
already Terman in his ‘Genetic Studies of Genius’ found gifted
children to show an advanced moral development making moral
decisions on moral levels which are usually found in late
adolescence (as cited in Janos and Robinson, 1985). Likewise,
Kohlberg (1964) and Gross (1993) found that highly gifted
children had very advanced abilities in conceptualizing moral
issues and provided moral reasoning on levels which are usually
prevalent only in very few adults. Finally, Chovan and Freeman
(1993) could show that the gifted children in their study achieved
higher levels of moral reasoning than their peers of average
ability. Regardless, more research with younger children is
needed to examine the role of intelligence in periods which are
crucial for moral development.
Further, one difficulty is that in most of these earlier
studies, groups of gifted children were determined by their
participation in certain programs for the gifted, e.g., summer
camps. Participation in such programs is usually based on teacher
nominations which have been shown to be problematic (Rost
and Hanses, 1997; Baudson, 2010). In many studies, giftedness
is not precisely defined and intelligence is in many cases not
even measured at all (Rost and Czeschlik, 1994). Further research
is needed which systematically measures intelligence as well as
moral development, and is not merely based on samples of
pre-selected students.
Moreover, most of the pertinent research has been done in
the (neo)-kohlbergian tradition using either the Moral Judgment
Interview (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987) or the Defining Issues
Test (DIT, Rest, 1979; Rest et al., 1999). The Moral Judgment
Interview consists of a series of moral dilemmas with open ended
questions designed to “elicit a subject’s own construction of moral
reasoning, moral frame of reference or assumptions about right
and wrong and the way these beliefs and assumptions are used
to make and justify moral decisions” (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987,
p. 61). Its coding procedure results in a specification of the stage
structure and definition of the developmental sequences of the
specific moral concepts within each stage. The DIT, in contrast,
is a multiple-choice instrument to measure moral judgment
development with the help of different moral dilemmas asking
participants to rate and rank a set of items in terms of their moral
importance. The idea underlying the DIT is that reading the
moral dilemmas and the issue statements activates moral schemas
(limited by the extent that a person has already developed them).
Both instruments have in common that in the dilemmas, different
moral principles conflict each other. This is interesting in terms
of moral reasoning from a rather philosophical point of view,
but it is less relevant in terms of children’s observable moral
development. These dilemmas do not reflect the type of moral
conflicts which children usually have to deal with. In children’s
daily lives, moral dilemmas rather consist of conflicts between
moral obligations on the one hand and personal desires or
needs on the other hand (Hoffman, 1991; Keller, 2001). Thus,
when measuring children’s moral reasoning competencies, it is
necessary to use realistic problems which are close to the world of
children’s experiences (Keller, 2001).
Hence, there is a lack of research that investigates the
relationship between moral development and intelligence using
an instrument that captures the kind of moral conflicts which
are common in children’s experiences of the world. It should be
tested whether findings from prior research can be generalized
to assessments of morality which are less abstract and closer to
everyday life.
Finally, another important issue is that morality or moral
development is not limited to moral cognitions, i.e., moral
judgments and moral reasoning. Moral cognition is only one
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dimension of morality. Most developmental researchers would
agree that moral development includes both – cognitive and
emotional aspects (Malti et al., 2009b; Gibbs, 2013). Nevertheless,
moral cognition (i.e., moral judgments and moral reasoning)
and moral emotions are closely connected and in continuous
interaction as the emergence of moral emotions is dependent
on moral cognitions (Dentici and Pagnin, 1992; Malti and
Latzko, 2010). Even though the two aspects are somehow
interdependent, there seems to be some disparity in the course
of development. Young children already show an elaborate moral
knowledge and are also able to reason in morally adequate
ways about moral transgressions (e.g., Turiel, 1983), yet they
do not understand the significance of moral transgressions for
their self-evaluative and empathic emotions before the age of
7 or 8 years and thus typically attribute positive emotions
to hypothetical wrongdoers in moral transgressions scenarios
(Nunner-Winkler and Sodian, 1988; Malti and Krettenauer,
2013). From a viewpoint of functional theories of emotions, this
means that morality (i.e., moral knowledge and understanding)
has not yet gained motivational force (Nunner-Winkler and
Sodian, 1988). Children need to develop moral motivation first,
which can be understood as the willingness to follow moral
rules which a person understands to be valid, even if this entails
personal costs or conflicts with one’s own interests (Nunner-
Winkler, 2007, 2009). Accordingly, moral development can be
understood as a two-step process: first, children develop moral
knowledge which enables moral judgments and moral reasoning,
and only in a second step, do they develop moral motivation
based on moral emotions (Nunner-Winkler, 2007). So, these
two aspects represent two dimensions of morality that are both
important for moral behavior and are closely connected. Moral
cognitions evoke knowledge structures enabling the emergence
of moral emotions (Dentici and Pagnin, 1992). Moral emotions,
in turn, engage motivational forces which are important for
the development of moral behavior (Dentici and Pagnin, 1992;
Hoffman, 2000; Malti and Latzko, 2010).
Hence, the measurement of morality or moral development
should not be restricted to moral judgments and reasoning.
Both, moral judgments and moral emotions (and the respective
reasoning) should be considered to ensure that a complete picture
of children’s moral development is obtained. And in terms of
relations to intelligence, not only moral judgments and moral
reasoning should be related to cognitive abilities. We assume
that intelligence is related to moral emotions as well as to moral
judgments and moral reasoning. Moral emotions are complex
emotions and they differ from basic emotions insofar as they have
a strong cognitive component and emotion attribution in morally
relevant situations necessarily involves a substantial degree of
cognitive processing (Malti et al., 2009b; Malti and Krettenauer,
2013). However, research on relations of intelligence and morality
is mostly limited to measures of moral judgment or moral
reasoning and there is a lack of research that investigates the role
of intelligence in moral emotions. Thus, research is needed that
systematically examines the relation between cognitive factors,
i.e., intelligence, and different facets of moral development
such as moral reasoning, moral emotion attribution and moral
motivation.
The current study examines the relation between children’s
moral development and intelligence across a range of
different moral transgressions. The study was designed to
test the hypothesis that intelligence contributes to individual
differences in children’s moral development by addressing some
shortcomings of prior studies.
While most prior studies have dealt with adolescents or young
adults, to evaluate the role of intelligence in moral development,
it is necessary to focus on individuals who are in a developmental
period of large changes in the relevant behavior. In our study,
we interviewed children aged between 6 and 9 as during this
developmental period, children show an awareness of a range of
moral principles, and research demonstrates that developmental
changes in children’s understanding of moral principles occur
during this period (Eisenberg et al., 1983; Smetana, 2006).
Furthermore, other measurement approaches of morality are
needed which not only include moral reasoning about abstract
dilemmas as in the (neo-)kohlbergian tradition. There is a lack of
studies that administer moral variables in a less abstract way, i.e.,
closer to children’s actual moral behavior in everyday life. The
current study aims at closing the gap by measuring children’s
morality using an approach which better mirrors the type of
moral challenges children face in their daily lives. By using moral
transgression stories, the current study applies an instrument that
is capable of capturing different facets of moral development
such as moral judgments and moral reasoning as well as moral
emotions and moral motivation. Furthermore, four different
stories were used to measure children’s morality across a range
of different moral transgressions scenarios.
With respect to the selection of participants, most prior
research relied on pre-selected samples from programs for gifted
students without testing intelligence, while the current study
draws on a sample for which intelligence was measured by an
established cognitive ability test. More specific, a non-verbal
intelligence test was used in order to measure inductive reasoning
competencies independently from verbal abilities.
In summary, the current study wants to examine the impact
of intelligence in the sense of inductive reasoning on children’s
moral developmental status. In line with prior research, we
assume that moral development is affected by intelligence.
More specifically, we expect intelligence-related differences in
reasoning about moral judgments. Furthermore, we expect a
positive correlation between intelligence and moral motivation
as well as between intelligence and negatively valenced moral
emotions (NVMEs) which are both also indicators of moral
development.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The sample size was determined based on the following
considerations: statistical power of ≥0.90 and small to medium
effect sizes of the expected correlations. A power analysis showed
that considering a small to medium effect of d ≥ 0.30, at least
112 participants were necessary to achieve a power of ≥0.90
(G∗Power; Faul et al., 2007). So, we aimed at this figure as a
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minimum sample size. Participants were recruited from regular
primary schools (n = 62) as well as from enrichment programs
for gifted children (n = 67). Children had been assigned to
gifted programs by teacher nomination. The aim of our recruiting
approach was not to get two subsamples, we rather pursued
a dual recruiting strategy in order to achieve an oversampling
of highly intelligent children. Since most studies in this field
examined participants from gifted programs, we were striving for
an oversampling of gifted children. This procedure successfully
resulted in two groups that only differ in their intelligence (see
chap. Intelligence), but not in age or gender. However, although
means of intelligence scores differ significantly between the
two groups, there is a considerable overlap in the distribution
of intelligence scores of both groups. A total of 129 children
(M = 7 years; 7 months, SD = 7.5, range = 6 years; 4 months
to 8 years; 10 months) from southwestern Germany participated
in the study. The sample included more boys (n = 77) than
girls (n = 52). Informed parental consent was obtained for
all participants. The study with its procedural details was
approved by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, Baden-
Württemberg.
Procedure and Assessments
All children were interviewed individually by trained research
assistants either in a separate room in their school or at their
homes. Interview sessions lasted approximately 30–45 min. All
interviews were audiotaped and later transcribed. Before the
interview started, children were told that they were supposed
to answer questions about picture stories. After a short warm-
up task to familiarize children with the interview situation and
the Likert-type smiley scale, all participants were presented four
picture stories in randomized order. For all tasks, the names used
in the stories matched the gender of the participant. After the
interview, children were praised and rewarded with a little gift
or candy. The intelligence test was conducted either in class as a
group test or individually at the child’s home. The order of the two
tasks (intelligence test and moral interview) was varied randomly.
Intelligence
Intelligence was assessed with subscales 3–5 of the CFT 1 by
Weiß and Osterland (1997). The CFT1 is a partial adaption
of the “Culture Fair Intelligence Tests – Scale 1” by Cattell
(1950). It captures general intelligence with a main focus on
general fluid ability defined by Cattell (1971), namely the
ability to analyze cognitive problems in novel situations such
as understanding rules or identifying patterns or relationships.
Using only figural material, the test is non-verbal and it does
not require any previous knowledge. Subtest 3 (classifications)
focuses on identifying relations in figural problems with varying
levels of difficulty. Subtest 4 (similarities) assesses the ability to
compare and relate figural material. And subtest 5 (matrices)
measures the ability to comprehend rules and relations in figural
cognitive tasks. All three subtests have in common that they
focus on relational thinking and the comprehension of rules and
regularities which can be understood as a central part of general
intelligence (Weiß and Osterland, 1997). IQ scores in the sample
ranged from 82 to 145 (M = 117.6, SD = 11.4) with M = 122.3
(SD = 9.7) for the children from programs for the gifted, and
M = 112.4 (SD = 11.0) for the children from regular primary
schools.
It should be mentioned that the norms of the intelligence test
that we used are from data mainly surveyed in the 1990s and thus
slightly overestimate children’s IQ. We used that test, though,
because it is an established instrument and has a good short
version for research. This helped us keep the test sessions short
which is important for this age group. Besides, for the purpose
of our study, overage norms are not a problem because we did
not want to make individual diagnostics. We need intelligence
scores to relate them with moral development and we are
interested in the covariation of the IQ scores with the indices of
moral development, not in “absolute” intelligence scores. Further,
despite the old norms, there were no ceiling effects in the IQ data
and no significant deviation from normal distribution.
Moral Development
In order to assess children’s moral developmental status, four
picture stories describing moral transgressions were used. More
precisely, the stories were about not sharing with a needy child,
stealing another child’s candy, hiding someone’s property, and
picking on someone. This type of moral transgression stories
has been frequently used and has been shown to be valid
(Eisenberg, 1982; Nunner-Winkler and Sodian, 1988; Keller et al.,
2003). Participants completed four measures for each story: (1)
dichotomous act evaluation (“Is what the child did okay or not
okay?”), (2) moral reasoning (responses to “Why?”), (3) Likert-
type emotion attribution to self as victimizer (“What about you? If
you had done that, how would you feel?” Likert-type: 1= very bad
to 4 = very good), and (4) justification for emotion attribution
(responses to “Why?”). These four types of measures were used
in all stories.
Coding and reliability
Participants’ justifications of act evaluations and attributed
emotions were coded with four categories developed from the
interviews themselves conforming with categories established
in the literature (e.g., Malti et al., 2009a), including: (1) Moral
reasons refer to moral norms or obligations (e.g., “it is not fair
to get all the reward”) as well as to empathy or other’s welfare
(e.g., “it’s wrong to do that because that would hurt him”). (2)
Sanction-oriented reasons refer to an authority or sanctions by
that authority (e.g., “you shouldn’t do that because if the teacher
sees it, you will get into trouble”). (3) Hedonistic reasons refer
to the satisfaction of personal needs and interests (e.g., “it’s ok to
take it because I love candy”). (4) Undifferentiated reasons are
unelaborated or uncodable (e.g., “Because he did it.” and “It’s not
ok because it’s not ok.”).
All justifications were coded by the first author and
approximately 25% of the interviews were coded by a second
researcher for inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s k = 0.89).
Justifications were coded as 1 = full use of the category;
0.5 = partial use with one other category; 0.33 = partial use with
two other categories; 0 = no use of the category. This procedure
was applied for proportional weighting of the use of multiple
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categories (thus proportions reflect the total sample). Analyses
were conducted on proportional usage.
Moral development indices
In order to operationalize children’s moral development, two
indices used in prior research were calculated: ‘Strength of Moral
Motivation’ (e.g., Asendorpf and Nunner-Winkler, 1992; Malti
et al., 2009b) and ‘NVMEs’ (Ongley and Malti, 2014). As the
attributed emotions and the corresponding justifications are
not independent (Nunner-Winkler, 2007), both indices combine
attributed emotions with the corresponding reasoning. The
attributed emotion in itself does not reliably tell us anything
about the underlying motive and thus does not suffice to
evaluate children’s moral developmental status. A combination of
both – emotion and justification – helps us understand children’s
(moral) motivation. In a first step, both types of indices were
calculated separately for each story and in a second step, the
scores were aggregated over all four stories resulting in two
different sum scores of emotion attribution to self as victimizer
and moral reasoning in the context of self-attributed emotions.
Strength of moral motivation. First, strength of moral motivation
was calculated for each story separately. The scoring procedure
follows the theoretical conceptualization of moral motivation as
presented in the introduction. A score of 0 indicates attribution
of a positive emotion justified by sanction-oriented, hedonistic or
undifferentiated reasons. A score of 1 indicates attribution of a
negative emotion justified by any reason that is not considered
moral (hedonistic, sanction-oriented, undifferentiated). And a
score of 2 indicates attribution of a negative emotion justified by
moral reasons. Following Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988), a
justification was considered moral as soon as a moral argument
was mentioned. The mean scores for moral motivation range
from 1.25 to 1.59 in the four stories [picking on someone:
M = 1.25 (SD = 0.76); stealing: M = 1.59 (SD = 0.71); hiding
someone’s property: M= 1.24 (SD= 0.84); not sharing: M= 1.40
(SD= 0.77)].
In a second step, the four moral motivation scores were
aggregated over all stories (Cronbach’s α = 0.71). Only
participants who got a moral motivation score for all four stories
were included in the sum score (N = 125). Thus, the score had
a range from 0 to 8 and a higher score indicates stronger moral
motivation. The mean of moral motivation sum score was 5.54
(SD= 2.25, range: 0–8).
Negatively valenced moral emotions (NVME). The concept of
NVMEs or ‘guilt’ (e.g., Ongley and Malti, 2014; Colasante et al.,
2016) also combines emotion attribution with the corresponding
justifications differentiating between moral reasons versus all
other types of reasons. A score of 0 = ‘no NVME’ indicates
attribution of a positive emotion or a negative emotion justified
by reasons which are not considered moral (hedonistic, sanction-
oriented, undifferentiated). A score of 1 = ‘slight NVME’
indicates attribution of a slightly negative emotion (“rather bad”)
with moral justifications and a score of 2 = ‘strong NMVE’
indicates a strong negative emotion (“very bad”) with moral
justifications. This procedure allows for some gradation among
the guilty or ’NVME’ responses acknowledging that children
experience varying levels of NVMEs (Kochanska et al., 2002;
Colasante et al., 2016). Again, justifications were considered
moral as soon as any moral argument was mentioned. The mean
scores for NVME range from 0.71 to 1.16 in the four stories
[picking on someone: M = 0.71 (SD = 0.86); stealing: M = 1.16
(SD = 0.85); hiding someone’s property: M = 0.85 (SD = 0.91);
not sharing: M = 0.87 (SD= 0.84)].
Analogous to the procedure concerning the moral motivation
score, the four separate NVME scores were aggregated over
all stories (Cronbach’s α = 0.64). Again, only participants who
got a score for all four stories were included in the sum score
(N = 125). A higher score indicates stronger NVMEs. The mean
of NVME sum score was 3.66 (SD= 2.4, range: 0–8).
RESULTS
Repeated measures ANOVAs were used to test hypotheses related
to differences in children’s reasoning about act evaluations by
intelligence. Multiple regression analyses and rank correlations
were used to test hypotheses related to the relationship between
intelligence and moral developmental status.
Act Evaluation
The act evaluation question was a control question in order to test
if all children know the underlying moral rule and to exclude the
possibility that the differences in emotion attribution are due to
lack of moral knowledge. All participants (N = 129) evaluated
all stories as wrong when completing the dichotomous act
evaluation question. Therefore, all reasoning about act evaluation
reference justifications why the act was wrong. See Table 1 for an
overview of children’s reasoning why the act is wrong.
Act Evaluation Reasoning and
Intelligence
In a first step, correlation analyses were conducted in order to
test whether there is a relation between intelligence and the use
of moral reasoning. Analyses revealed no significant correlation
coefficients between moral reasoning and intelligence in any of
TABLE 1 | Proportions (standard deviations) of justifications for act
evaluations and emotion attribution.
Picking on
someone
Stealing Hiding
someone’s
property
Not
sharing
Act evaluation
Moral 0.77 (0.37) 0.89 (0.28) 0.85 (0.35) 0.81 (0.38)
Sanction-oriented 0.13 (0.27) 0.10 (0.25) 0.09 (0.27) 0.00 (0.00)
Hedonistic 0.03 (0.16) 0.00 (0.04) 0.02 (0.15) 0.06 (0.21)
Undifferentiated 0.07 (0.26) 0.02 (0.12) 0.04 (0.19) 0.13 (0.34)
Emotion attribution
Moral 0.40 (0.47) 0.68 (0.44) 0.49 (0.49) 0.55 (0.47)
Sanction-oriented 0.17 (0.34) 0.13 (0.31) 0.16 (0.35) 0.01 (0.09)
Hedonistic 0.25 (0.41) 0.14 (0.33) 0.26 (0.43) 0.24 (0.40)
Undifferentiated 0.19 (0.39) 0.05 (0.21) 0.09 (0.28) 0.20 (0.40)
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the stories (picking on someone: r = −0.12, p = 0.191; stealing:
r = 0.10, p = 0.246; hiding someone’s property: r = 0.01,
p= 0.918; not sharing: r = 0.02, p= 0.838).
In a second step, we followed the convention established by
Turiel (2008) to use ANOVA-based procedures for reasoning
analyses because they have been shown to be more appropriate
for analyzing this type of data. In order to test the hypothesis
that participants’ justifications for their act evaluation differ
depending on their intelligence, a separate 2 (Gender: Male,
Female) × 3 (Age: 6 year olds, 7 year olds, 8 year olds) × 3
(Justification: Moral, Sanction-oriented, Hedonistic) ANOVA
with repeated measures on the last factor and intelligence as a
covariate was conducted for each story. The repeated measures
factor represents children’s reasoning about act evaluation.
Means are proportions of use of the respective category. There
was a significant main effect of justification in two of the
stories [picking on someone: F(2,244) = 3.53, p = 0.031,
η2p = 0.03; hiding someone’s property: F(2,244) = 4.30,
p = 0.015, η2p = 0.03]. This revealed that participants for both
stories used more moral justifications than any other reasons
(ps < 0.001). Furthermore, for the not sharing story, there was a
significant three-way interaction of justification, gender and age
F(4,244)= 4.17, p= 0.003, η2p = 0.06. In the group of 6 and 7 year
olds, boys and girls displayed significant differences in the use of
moral justifications (ps < 0.05). In the youngest age group, boys
(M = 0.93, SD = 0.26) mentioned more moral reasons than girls
(M= 0.69, SD= 0.46). The reverse finding emerged for the 7 year
olds: girls (M = 0.95, SD= 0.22) mentioned more moral reasons
than boys (M = 0.70, SD = 0.45). For the oldest age group, the
8 year olds, there were no differences between girls and boys.
However, for the current research question, the crucial results
are those including intelligence as a covariate. More specifically,
we expected intelligence-related differences in moral reasoning.
Analyses revealed no significant main effects of intelligence in any
of the stories [picking on someone: F(1,122) = 0.45, p = 0.505,
η2p = 0.00; stealing: F(1,122)= 1.33, p= 0.251, η2p = 0.01; hiding
someone’s property: F(1,122) = 0.02, p = 0.889, η2p = 0.00; not
sharing: F(1,122)= 2.94, p= 0.089, η2p = 0.02]. Further, there was
no significant interaction between intelligence and justifications.
In other words, there were no intelligence-related differences in
children’s reasoning about act evaluation.
Emotion Attribution
Percentages of the attributed emotions for all stories can be
found in Table 2. Analyses revealed no significant correlation
coefficients between attributed emotions and intelligence in any
of the stories (picking on someone: r = 0.16, p = 0.065;
stealing: r = 0.09, p = 0.330; hiding someone’s property:
r = 0.12, p = 0.174; not sharing: r = 0.16, p = 0.752). Table 1
provides an overview of children’s justifications for their emotion
attributions.
Moral Development Indices and
Intelligence
The attributed emotion in itself does not suffice to evaluate
children’s moral developmental status because it does not reliably
TABLE 2 | Percentage of attributed emotions.
Attributed
emotion
Picking on
someone
Stealing Hiding
someone’s
property
Not
sharing
(1) Very bad 45 51.9 47.7 42.1
(2) Rather bad 35.7 35.7 26.6 40.5
(3) Rather good 10.9 7.8 11.7 13.5
(4) Very good 8.5 4.7 14.1 4.0
tell us anything about the underlying motive. Thus, in the
following analyses moral development indices are used which
combine both – emotion attribution and justification.
In order to further test the impact of intelligence on
children’s moral development, multiple regression analyses on
moral motivation and on NVMEs were conducted for all
stories separately, including intelligence, age and gender as
predictors. Further, to test the hypothesis that participants’
moral development is positively related to their intelligence, rank
correlations between moral motivation and intelligence as well as
between NVMEs and intelligence were calculated.
Multiple regression analyses showed that intelligence was
not a significant predictor for moral motivation or NVMEs
in any of the stories (see Table 3 for t-values of regression
coefficients). Analyses with the aggregated scores did not show
intelligence to be a significant predictor, either [moral motivation:
t(121) = 0.58, p = 0.563; NVME: t(121) = −0.41, p = 0.683].
In the story picking on someone age contributed significantly
to moral motivation [t(125) = −2.17, p = 0.032]. In the
story hiding someone’s property gender revealed as a significant
predictor of moral motivation [t(124) = −2.33, p = 0.032]. For
the aggregated score moral motivation score, age and gender
significantly contributed to the variance [age: t(121) = −2.33,
p= 0.021; gender: t(121)=−2.51, p= 0.013]. Since the results on
age and gender are not relevant for the current research question,
they are not further considered.
Correlation analyses revealed no significant correlation
coefficients between moral development and intelligence in
any of the stories. We found no significant correlations with
intelligence for either moral motivation or for NVMEs, see
Table 4. Correlation analyses with the aggregated scores did not
reveal any significant results, either (moral motivation: r = 0.04,
p= 0.632; NVME: r =−0.03, p= 0.713).
DISCUSSION
The purpose of the current study was to investigate whether
intelligence affects moral development as assessed across a
range of different moral transgressions. Thereby, the study was
designed to address some of the shortcomings of prior research
by examining younger children and applying an approach
that is more closely connected to children’s daily lives. By
including moral emotions, a broader conceptualization of moral
development was chosen than in prior research in the field
which has often been restricted to moral judgments or moral
reasoning about those judgments. Furthermore, we did not rely
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TABLE 3 | t-values of regression coefficients with p-values in parentheses.
Picking on
someone
Stealing Hiding someone’s
property
Not sharing
Moral motivation t(125) = 0.72
(p = 0.475)
t(125) = 0.00
(p = 0.998)
t(124) = 0.23
(p = 0.820)
t(122) = 0.99
(p = 0.325)
NVME t(125) = 0.89
(p = 0.374)
t(125) = −1.53
(p = 0.128)
t(124) = −0.01
(p = 0.993)
t(122) = −0.52
(p = 0.605)
TABLE 4 | Correlations of moral scores and intelligence.
Picking on
someone
Stealing Hiding someone’s
property
Not sharing
Moral motivation r = 0.08
(p = 0.348)
r = −0.04
(p = 0.647)
r = 0.01
(p = 0.938)
r = 0.07
(p = 0.436)
NVME r = 0.09
(p = 0.314)
r = −0.15
(p = 0.091)
r = −0.02
(p = 0.825)
r = −0.02
(p = 0.804)
N 129 129 128 126
on a pre-selected group of gifted children, but directly measured
children’s intelligence. Altogether, 129 children aged between
6 years; 4 months and 8 years; 10 months were interviewed using
four different moral transgression stories.
Given our results, findings from prior research with
adolescents or adults cannot simply be extended to younger
participants. We found no significant correlations between
moral development and intelligence in any of the stories.
Neither for moral cognitions, nor for moral emotions, did
we find any evidence for intelligence-related differences. More
specifically, there were no significant correlations between moral
motivation and intelligence and no correlations between NVMEs
and intelligence, either. Neither did we find any intelligence-
related differences in moral reasoning about act evaluations.
Therefore, our findings indicate that for children aged between
6 years; 4 months and 8 years; 10 months, inductive reasoning
competencies, i.e., intelligence, cannot explain differences in
moral development.
At a first glance, this seems to contradict prior findings
which demonstrated strong connections between intelligence and
morality. How did prior research differ from ours, and why do we
expect our study to be more apt than prior ones?
Firstly, as we have illustrated in the introduction, research that
examined the association of morality and intelligence, typically
used a different approach to measure morality. Our concern is
that traditional measures like the DIT or the Moral Judgment
Interview are quite disconnected to everyday life and the results
of these instruments rather represent an ability to evaluate
different moral principles in a prescriptive way, i.e., what should
be done in the respective situation (Elm and Weber, 1994). Thus,
it is questionable if they really measure a person’s morality, i.e.,
a person’s level of moral development, in the sense of what a
person would really decide to do in morally relevant situations.
It could be assumed that this ability – which can rather be
considered as philosophizing about moral problems – is stronger
connected to intellectual abilities than the attribution of emotions
or the reasoning about act evaluations in the type of moral
transgression stories we used in the current study. Especially,
as the dilemmas used in the DIT or in the Moral Judgment
Interview are very complex and abstract, and remote from the
kind of moral problems faced by people in their everyday lives.
Correspondingly, Malti et al. (2013) concluded based on their
findings that it is reasonable to assume a connection between
intelligence and moral reasoning but not between intelligence
and moral emotions.
Some authors go even further and claim that the DIT is not
conceptually distinct from measures of verbal ability, meaning
that DIT scores are reducible to intellectual ability (Sanders et al.,
1995). In other words, it is even questionable if prior results
really show a connection between morality and intelligence or if
they can be considered an artifact that is produced because the
instrument is confounded with intelligence.
Furthermore, many prior studies relied on pre-selected groups
of gifted children (e.g., from summer camps or other enrichment
programs). It is often unclear which criteria the classification of
giftedness is based on in these programs. Usually, children are
nominated by teachers, and teacher judgments are biased by the
children’s families’ socio economic background and personality
traits like conscientiousness or effort, etc. (Baudson, 2010). Thus,
it is unclear whether the findings are really due to intelligence
or whether they might be caused by other factors which are
typical for some gifted children. In the current study, we did
not rely on such a pre-selection. We recruited children from
regular elementary schools as well as from a program for gifted
children, but we directly measured intelligence in all children
who participated and found no relationship between intelligence
and our measures of morality. This aligns with research from
the field of prosocial development which is closely related to
moral development. For example Paulus et al. (2015) assessed
intelligence and working memory and did not find any significant
correlations between general cognitive abilities and sharing
behavior, either.
However, some points remain to be mentioned and discussed.
First of all, we interviewed children at elementary school age.
Needless to say, we cannot rule out the possibility that intelligence
does matter in even younger children. It is conceivable that in
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younger age groups, intelligence leads to differences in moral
development and in our sample the influence of intelligence
just does not come into effect due to a threshold effect,
meaning that above a certain degree of intelligence there
might be no relation to moral development. In terms of
information processing, this could mean that a certain degree
of intelligence is necessary to adequately process the extent
of information that is at play in morally relevant situations.
Accordingly, it is plausible to assume that for the normal
range of intelligence as well as for the higher range, there
is no relation between intelligence and moral development.
Thus, to address this question, future studies should include
even younger children and children with lower intelligence
scores.
Secondly, further research needs to replicate the current
findings with other samples and multiple measures. For example,
it is conceivable that moral reasoning ability is more related
to verbal intelligence than to general intelligence measured
with a non-verbal instrument. However, the aim of the
current study was to examine the relationship between moral
development and inductive reasoning independently of verbal
abilities.
Further, it was surprising that we did not find any age-related
differences for the emotion attribution questions and for the
moral motivation sum score, and only a small but significant
correlation with the NVME sum score. So, one might think that
the children were too old and did not differ in their answers at
all. However, there were no ceiling effects in any of the moral
variables and the answers showed a lot of variation, albeit without
relation to the children’s age. One possible explanation for the
lack of age-related findings might be that in the current study,
children’s age range is limited to 2.5 years in contrast to other
studies including wider ranges.
Moreover, some researchers might question the procedure of
considering a justification to be moral as soon as one moral
argument is mentioned. Some authors argue that it is better
to use the first, spontaneous, answer (Ongley and Malti, 2014).
Accordingly, a justification is only considered moral if the first
answer is a moral one. But we assume that the spontaneous
answer is not necessarily the most important argument for the
child, because the order of reasons that children provide can also
be influenced by other things, e.g., situational aspects (Nunner-
Winkler and Sodian, 1988). Thus, we argue that when a child is
able to express a moral argument, this argument does have certain
significance for the child and therefore can be understood in the
sense of moral motivation.
All in all, the findings of the current study provide some first
evidence that moral development – measured in a way that is
closely connected to everyday life and across a range of different
moral transgression scenarios – is not affected by children’s
general intelligence in the sense of inductive reasoning measured
with figural material. Of course, it cannot be denied, that children
need a certain amount of cognitive abilities in morally relevant
situations to coordinate perspectives, select and process relevant
information, anticipate consequences, and interpret the whole
situation (Dentici and Pagnin, 1992; Derryberry et al., 2005).
But given our findings, it can be assumed that young children
already have a sufficient minimum level of cognitive abilities to
successfully manage morally relevant situations. Thus, individual
differences in children’s moral development need to be explained
by other factors than intelligence. Nonetheless, the current
findings still need to be replicated in further studies.
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